Antitrust policy and price collusion : public agencies vs delegation by Gianmaria MARTINI & Cinzia ROVESTI
Antitrust policy and price collusion :
public agencies vs délégation
Gianmaria Martini*
Department of Management and Information
Technology, University of Bergamo, Italy
Cinzia Rovesti*
Autorité Garante délia Concorrenza e del Mercato, Roma, Italy
Introduction
The ongoing debate on the effectiveness of antitrust policy in limiting anti-
competitive activities helps to understand its intrinsic complexity.1 The
perception is that the convicted cases are only a small part of an iceberg
of anti-competitive activity.2 This implies that the cases to investigate or
to supervise are so many that is highly unlikely that an independent public
agency in charge of the policy implementation3 may be able to review ail
of them. As argued by Souam (2001), the antitrust authorities are indeed
subject to two sorts of constraints : limited resources (i.e. they cannot deal
* We wish to thank John D. Hey and Claude d'Aspremont for helpful discussions. We also thank Paolo Buc-
cirossi, Giuseppe Colangelo, Gianni De Fraja, Giantuca Femminis, Isabel Grilo and Gerd Wetnrich fortheir
comments. We hâve also greatly benefited from comments and suggestions provided by two anonymous
référées. The usual disclaimer applies. The contents expressed in this paper are the autrtors' view on the
issue analyzed and not that of the Italian Antitrust Authority. Correspondance to : G. Martini, Department of
Management and Information Technology, University of Bergamo, viale Marconi 5,1-24044 Dalmine (BG),
Italy. E-mail : gianmaria.martini@unibg.it
1 There is still a debate within the économie profession about the social impact and value of antitrust laws.
Ross (1984) argued that in many cases antitrust laws were passed in response to pelitical lobbying by small
firms complaining about the large firms' ability to secure lower priées in their purchases and supplies.
2 For instance, the OECD has recently listed more than 39 industries as worthy of investigation, ranging from
shipping to diamonds (see The Economisé "Setting the trap", 31 st October2002).
3 Public agency examples are the DG Compétition (DGC) (and national authorities) in Europe, the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Fédéral Trade Commission (FTC) in the US.
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with ail cases and monitor ail the markets) and imperfect information4 (the
agencies do not observe many characteristics and behaviors of the firms).
In this paper we focus on the former constraint and investigate whe-
ther it is possible to improve the overall effectiveness of antitrust policy by
designing a scheme where différent agents may act against anti-competitive
activities : a public agency and consumers. If consumers bring a case to
Courts we hâve a régime where the enforcement of the antitrust policy0 is
delegated to private agents, whose préférences may be différent from those
of the public agency.6 If the Court, which is in charge of the final décision
under this régime,7 identifies an illégal action, consumers get a monetary
compensation for their actual damage.8
Both the US and European antitrust législations explicitly déclare
that private parties may start a case. The US DOJ states that there are
three main ways in which the Fédéral antitrust laws are enforced : criminal
and civil enforcement actions brought by itself, civil enforcement actions
brought by the FTC and lawsuits brought by private parties asserting da
mage daims.9 The European DGC entitles natural or légal persons to lodge
a complaint for violation of antitrust laws.10
4 The diffusion of anti-competitive activities across the industries and the agency's imperfect information
imply that in some sectors an investigation is not made because the agency simply does not know that such
activities are performed. However a more informed agent (e.g. the consumers or the firms demanding the
good produced by the colluding firms) might instead décide to launch the investigation. The effectiveness
of antitrust régimes where private agents and the public agency hâve asymmetric information about the
anti-competitive activity might be the object of future research.
5 This consists of a décision to carry out an investigation about the firms1 behavior, undertaken to estabtish
whether they violated the law or not.
6 In monetary économies there is by now a comprehensive literature beginning with Rogoff (1985) arguing
that a government should delegate monetary policy to a central banker who is independent and more
conservative than the government itself. A récent paper by Schultz (1999) shows instead that in présence
of polarization, délégation may reduce the incentive to achieve a deflationary policy.
7 It is essential to point out that analyzing the délégation régime is différent from investigating the impact of
some new instruments as the leniency programs (Motta and Polo (2002)). The latter hâve been successful in
discovering some coliusive behaviors because they increase the carters members (i.e. those which benefit
from the collusion but prefer to reduce the risk of paying a fine) incentive to defect (even if the literature
has not considered the réputation effects of reporting to the public agency). The délégation régime regards
instead the incentive to launch an investigation of those agents injured by the coliusive behavior.
8 In the US the Clayton Act is a civil statute (carrying no criminal pénalités), passed in 1914 and amended
in 1950. Title 15, Chapter 1, Section 15 ("Suits by persons injured") permits private parties injured by an
antitrust violation to sue to Fédéral Court for three times their actual damage, plus Court costs and attorneys'
fées.
9 US DOJ, Antitrust Division, "Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer", Section 3, available at
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/div.stats/9142.htm. Salop and White (1988) and Bizjak and Coles (1995) show
that in the US the number of cases initiated by private parties is much bigger than those initiated by the
DOJ or the FTC.
10 Council Régulation (EC) N. 1/2003, Chapter III, article 7. There is an important différence between the US
and European législation concerning such "private" lawsuits : in the US private agents directly bring the case
to Courts and, if they win, get a monetary reward. In Europe, they signal the case to the public agency and do
not get any compensation (and this strongly limits private enforcement actions of antitrust laws). Hence the
European approach does not relax the public agency's limited resources constraint. This différence is due
to the European choice to hâve a unique subject acting as détective and judge (while thèse two functions
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Since our goal is to compare the effectiveness of the public agency
and délégation régimes in limiting anti-competitive activities, we design
an antitrust game played by an "antitrust" agent and an industry (where
firms are potentially engaged in horizontal collusion), in order to identify
the optimal policy and the degree of collusive behavior tolerated (i.e. the
maximum level of output not triggering an investigation). The equilibrium
outcomes are then ranked in social welfare terms, in order to highlight the
régimes' effectiveness.11
Our main finding is that social welfare is greater if both types of agents
can launch an investigation, and so letting consumers to play an active rôle
in fighting anti-competitive activities may reduce the impact of the public
agency's limited resources constraint and increase the antitrust policy effec
tiveness.
We will show that délégation weakly dominâtes the public agency ré
gime, and that this resuit dépends upon the différences in the objective
functions of the two antitrust agents : consumers only care about their sur
plus and so they consider the reward they get in présence of anti-competitive
activities as an incrémental surplus, while the public agency takes into ac-
count both consumers and producers surplus and sees the fine as a monetary
transfer. As a conséquence, consumers will credibly start off a higher level of
investigation activity than that set by a public agency. The agency, as a re
suit, tolérâtes a higher degree of collusion than consumers, i.e. the latter will
intervene even in présence of "small" violations of the antitrust law, while
the former will move only against "relevant" anti-competitive behaviors.
Looking at our results more in détails, we hâve reached the following :
First. délégation achieves the first best solution (i.e. marginal costs pricing)
in case of complète information. Second, such a solution is not reached if
the industry has private information about its production efficiency, and the
equilibrium might be either pooling or semi-separating. Third, délégation
dominâtes the public agency régime independently of the rule of reimbur-
sement of investigation costs : if the burden of thèse costs is the same bet-
ween the two régimes, dominance is still valid. Fourth, the public agency
régime never reaches the first best solution. Moreover, if the agency has
imperfect information about production costs, the same second best out-
come (in terms of social welfare) is achieved under separating equilibria,
semi-separating equilibria and the unique pooling equilibrium. Last, under
both régimes, the pooling equilibrium is the unique solution where the more
efficient industry type enjoys an informational rent.
Thèse results hâve been reached starting from a unified framework,
where there is a unique antitrust agent, and where the two régimes consi-
dered hère can be classified as polar cases.12 This framework is useful to
11 This paper analyzes anti-competitive activities where firms are engaged in price-fixing, and form a cartel
acting as a monopolist. The model can be extended to vertical agreements and abuses of dominant position
(since the conviction can remove the abuse and so it increases the allocative efficiency). The model cannot
deal with mergers and acquisitions.
12 The introduction of a unified framework is an important suggestion made by an anonymous référée.130 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(2), 2004
point out the factors inducing the différent behaviors undertaken by the
antitrust agent under the two régimes in présence of the same collusive be-
havior. Thèse différences are well highlighted in the complète information
case, and so in the imperfect information case only the two spécifie régimes
will be analyzed.
Our analysis is related to previous works on antitrust policy effective-
ness. Block, Nold and Sidak (1981), Salant (1987) and Besanko and Spulber
(1990) explored whether antitrust policy leads to a welfare improvement (if
compared with laissez faire) or not, and reached, with différent views, a
positive answer.13 Besanko and Spulber (1989a) provided a model where
a public agency faces an industry possibly engaged in horizontal collusion
and showed that in equilibrium, even if the agency can prove an illégal price
fixing behavior, some degree of collusion is tolerated. Souam (1998, 2001)
investigated the effects on social welfare of alternative régimes of fines.14
The last two contributions, the closest ones to our work, présent a
model with the following séquence of events : the public agency moves first
by announcing a schedule of probability of investigation. Having observed
it the industry décides whether to collude or not and then the agency im-
plements the ex-ante announced policy. Clearly, the last assumption implies
that the agency commits herself to the ex-ante announced policy, i.e. she
cannot change her décision after having observed the industry's choice. We
believe, on the one hand, that this framework does not reflect the actual
implementation of antitrust policy. As highlighted by Banks (1992), such
an approach lacks of realism, since in real world antitrust disputes the dé
cision to launch an investigation is taken after having observed a signal
sent by the industry. On the other hand, it does not capture the idea that
firms might hâve a first mover advantage in the antitrust game. Indeed the
promulgation of the laws and the institution of a public agency are once-
and-for-all décisions, but the policy enforcement is based on a case-by-case
approach. In the US the DOJ states some examples of illégal actions (e.g.
identical priées, fixing quotas, price changes of equal amount at the same
time, identical bids, etc.), but she explicitly déclares that thèse signs are by
no means conclusive évidence of collusion.15 Therefore firms choose their
market conducts being aware that thèse will influence the probability of an
investigation. Hence we provide a model with a différent séquence of events :
the industry moves first by choosing an output level and the antitrust agent
13 Salant pointed out that antitrust policy is welfare neutral because private agents may hâve the "perverse"
incentive to be more damaged today in orderto get a higher reward tomorrow (the "treble damage award").
Besanko and Spulber showed that Salant's resuit does not extend to the asymmetric information case
(consumera face uncertainty about the future awards, and so they may loose the incentives to be damaged
today).
14 Building on a spécifie parameterization he showed that fines related to sales are more efficient, in welfare
terms, than fines linked with profits, when rents achievable Ihrough collusion are not high.
15 US DOJ, Antitrust Division, "Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer", Section 7, available at
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(being the public agency or the consumers) chooses after having observed
the industry's décision.16
The paper is organized as follows : in Section 2 we présent the mo-
del and the unified framework for the complète information case. Then we
analyze the optimal policy if the industry has private information about
its costs. Section 3 présents the public agency régime and Section 4 the
délégation régime. The comparison between the régimes is displayed in Sec
tion 5, while Section 6 highlights the main conclusions of the paper. In the
Appendix we report ail the propositions' proofs.
2 The model : a unified framework
Consider a market composed by N identical risk-neutral firms producing an
homogeneous product. Total industry output is q = X)j=i Qj- For simplicity,
let us assume that the cost function is characterized by constant marginal
costs and no fbced costs, i.e. Cj{qj) = Oqj (j = 1,2,.... N). Firms and the
antitrust agent (being the public agency or consumers) know the market
demand function D(q).17
As usual, each firm maximizes its profits, given by nj(qi,... ,qj,...
, gAr, 0) = qj{P{J2j(Qj)) ~#]• Firms face the following alternative : (a) not to
collude, (b) to collude. Under case (a) they act independently and behave
as in Bertrand compétition, so that the final industry outcome is the com
pétitive output : qc. If (b) is chosen, they act as a single player, the industry,
and they jointly agrée on a level of output q < qc. The antitrust agent ob
serves q and décides whether to begin an investigation (action {i}) or not
(action {m}).18 Hence, we define, for each observed ç, {3(q) G [0,1] as the
probability to launch an investigation; if the latter takes on, we assume that
it is possible to uncover whether horizontal collusion has occurred.19 In this
case a fine F G [0, A), where A (with A < oo) is the maximum fine20, is
enforced to the guilty firms, and equally shared among them.21 Moreover,
17
16 This approach has already been adopted in the tax compliance literature (Andreoni et al, (1998)), in régu
lation (Banks (1992)) and in law économies (Besanko and Spulber (1989b)).
It is assumed that the cartel supplies the entire market demand. It is possible to adapt the problem to a cartel
which acts as a dominant firm and faces a compétitive fringe, with residual demand RD(p) = D(p) — S{p),
where S{p) is the fringe's supply function.
18 An investigation can cover both a working agreement and a planned arrangement communicated to the
antitrust agent. Under the latter case the cartel "announces" an output level and the public agency décides
whether to investigate or not.
19 Martin (2000) présents a model where there is a probability r that price-fixirtg is not detected, and shows
that the cartel only cares about the effective probability of being detected, i.e. /3(g)(1 — r).
20 We assume that it is not possible, because of firms' liability, to hâve a huge fine.
21 In principle, the fine should dépend upon the damage due to the illégal behavior. In this case we should
hâve a fine F{q), with J^ < 0. However, an interesting feature of our model is that social wetfare under
the public agency régime is independent from the fine's magnitude, while under délégation social welfare
is increasing in F. Therefore our results hold also in case of endogenous fine.132 Recherches économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(2), 2004
some behavioral constraints (cease and desist orders and injunctions, i.e.
spécifie acts which can directly modify the social welfare) are imposed, so
that firms' coordination becomes unfeasible22 and a Bertrand-Nash solu
tion is achieved.23 Last, the investigation involves some fixed costs K, with
K > 0;24 the impact of différent rules about the payment of thèse costs will
be analyzed.
The antitrust agent has the following "gênerai" objective function :
W = P P{x)dx - P(q)q -f X[P(q) - 0]q, (0 ^ A ^ 1) (1)
Jo
where A is the weight given to industry profit.20 This is a formulation where
the consumer surplus cannot hâve a lower weight than industry profit, and
where the public agency régime is the case where A = 1 (the public agency
maximizes the social welfare with equal weight on consumer surplus and in
dustry profit), while the délégation régime is the case with A = 0 (consumers
maximize their surplus). Concerning the payment of investigation costs K,
we define # as the fraction of thèse costs paid by the antitrust agent, with
0 < -â < 1. Again the public agency régime is the case where ■â = 1 (since
the agency takes fully into account the policy costs), while under délégation
we hâve that ti = 1 only if consumers lose the suit and that i? = 0 if instead
they win it. From our assumptions, we hâve the following antitrust agent's
payofï (W) if an output q < qc is observed and a successful investigation is
launched :
P{x)dx -8q + F-\F-'dK = CS{qc) + (1 - \)F - $K (2)
while if the same output is observed and no investigation is launched, the
antitrust agent gets (1), i.e. W(ni) = CS(q) + A?r(ç). Since (3{q) is the
probability that an investigation is launched, the industry's expected profit
if they décide to collude is as follows : 26
argmaxq(l - 0(q))*(q) - P(q)[F + (1 - <?)*] (3)
22 This hypothesis is reinforced by Bizjak and Coles's (1995) empirical results:by studying private antitrust
litigation in the US they found that the threat of potentially monetary damages lacks power to explain
défendants' behavior. In contrast, the potential imposition of behavioral constraints is their main concern.
Hence it seems reasonable to assume that antitrust policy can enforce a more compétitive solution since,
at least in the short-run, it modifies firms' behavior.
23 In a static framework, as that depicted in the model, it is also possible to make a less extrême assumption
in case of conviction, e.g. a Cournot equitibrium, but this will not change significantly the analysis. Indeed it
is essential that an investigation yietds a positive effect on 1he intensity of compétition within the industry.
24 Thèse costs may be due, for instance, to administrative costs, légal costs etc. We assume that there are no
variable costs of investigation, i.e. those costs affected by the antitrust agent's effort.
25 It is straightforward to show that, if A =/1, the output maximizing(1) \sq = —j^X ^ ~ ^ > Q°m However-
since the industry cannot be forced to produce more than the compétitive output, we assume that a feasible
solution of the maximization problem (1) belongs to [0,9e], i.e. we hâve a corner solution at q* = qc.
26 We assume that the profit function, itj{q\,..., qj,..., q^, 8), is quasi-concave in fy-Vj. Hence there
exists a unique monopoly quantity, qM'.Gianmaria Martini, Cinzia Rovesti 133
The timing of the antitrust game is the following :27 at t = 1 firms
décide whether to collude or not, and at t = 2 the antitrust agent chooses
whether launching an investigation is worthy or not. The policy is imple-
mented and the players' payoffs are computed.
2.1 The complète information case
To dérive the optimal policy we look for a subgame perfect equilibrium star-
ting, by backward induction, from Computing the antitrust agent's optimal
strategy at t = 2. If qc is observed, the antitrust agent will choose {ni}:
if instead q < qc, from (2) and W{ni) = CS(q) + Xn(q), we can state the
following Lemma.
Lemma 1 In case of complète information the antitrust agent's optimal
strategy att = 2 is as follows :
where q satisfies
CS(qc) + (1 - X)F > CS(q) + Xn(q) + tiK (5)
Ifq<qc, the antitrust agent tolérâtes some degree of collusion.
Lemma 1 shows that the antitrust policy against horizontal collusion
in a spécifie industry is an interesting problem if there exists an output q
higher than qM28 where the antitrust agent is indiffèrent between starting
an investigation or doing nothing. Unless q = qc a sufficiently small degree
of collusion is tolerated. Clearly, q is inversely related to tf. Given the policy
shown in (4) the industry at t = 1 has the following strategy :
■{ qM iîO <q^qM (6)
27 As mentioned before, one possibility is that the antitrust agent moves first, and sélects a schedule of proba-
bilities to Iaunch an investigation (foreach q € [0, qc[), that is announced to the firms. The latter observes
it and décide whether to collude or not. Then the antitrust agent implements the previously announced
schedule, i.e. the décision to Iaunch an investigation is taken before observing the industry's choice. Under
this timing it is straightforward to show that the first best solution is always achieved (i.e. independently of
the magnitude of A and t?) by announcing the following policy :
ifg<gc
otherwise
so that the public agency régime (where À = t? = 1) achieves the first best solution, and a comparison with
délégation is uninteresting.
28 If q < qM then the industry can produce the monopoly output without the threat of being prosecuted for
anti-competitive activities.134 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(2), 2004
We can now focus on the following "polar" cases :(1) A = ■# = 1 (the
public agency régime), (2) A = 1,1? = 0, (3) A = 0, 0 = 1 and (4) A = ti = 0
(the délégation régime). By comparing the players' stratégies under the
above cases we will provide some useful insights about the welfare properties
of the antitrust policy and, above ail, we will highlight the rôle played in
the two régimes considered by two important factors : (1) the différence in
the objective functions (identified by the parameter A) and (2) the différent
rules of reimbursement of the investigation costs (i.e. the parameter i9).
Under case (1) (i.e. the public agency régime) condition (5) amounts
to : CS(qc) — CS(q) — 7r(q) ^ K, so that q < qc and a small degree of
collusion is accepted. Consequently, at t = 1 the industry will restrict output
at q. Under case (2) we can observe the impact on the policy implemented
by a public agency (A = 1) of a rule of reimbursement of investigation
costs similar to that adopted under the délégation régime (# = 0, if the
investigation is successful). Under this settings q is defined by the following
condition : CS(qc) — CS(q) — n(q) ^ 0. The latter is always fulfilled and so in
this case q = qc, i.e. the first best solution is achieved. Case (3) is a situation
where the antitrust agent has the same objective function than under the
délégation régime (A = 0), but it has to bear ail the investigation costs
(1? = 1). Hère q is defined implicitly by the following condition: CS(qc) —
CS(q)+F-K ^ 0, which is always fulfilled as long as F > K. Again q = qc,
i.e. the first best solution is achieved. Last, if A = d = 0 (case (4)) we hâve
the délégation régime, and condition (5) becomes CS(qc) — CS(q) + F ^ 0,
which is clearly always satisfied, and so q = qc. The analysis points out that
the first best solution is achieved in ail cases but one, the public agency
régime with ê = 1, and so we hâve shown the following :
Proposition 1 In case of complète information délégation achieves the
first best solution and (weakly) dominâtes the public agency régime. The
dominance does not dépend on the rules of reimbursement of K.
The intuition underlying Proposition 1 is the following : the public
agency régime is dominated by the délégation régime unless ■# = 0. However,
if i? = 1, i.e. also consumers hâve to pay the investigation costs in case
of success as in the public agency régime, the délégation régime achieves
the first best solution, while the public agency tolérâtes a little degree of
collusion. It means that if the burden of K is the same between the two
régimes and fl ^ 0, délégation dominâtes the public agency régime. The
explanation is that consumers, even in the extrême case where d = 1, will
choose to launch an investigation if q < qc as long as F > K. Indeed F is
a reward that increases consumers surplus, while for the agency is only a
monetary transfer. Hence the two régimes yield différent policies and achieve
différent outeomes because of the différence in the antitrust agent's objective
functions, and the rule of reimbursement of the investigation costs does not
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2.2 The imperfect information case
We now modify the game introducing an asymmetric information structure :
firms know their own costs, but the public agency and the consumers do not.
Each firm has the following costs function : Cj(qj) = 9j,qj (j = 1,2,..., N),
with 9i € {#i,#2}i and 9\ < 62. AU firms are perfectly correlated in ef-
ficiency, and we dénote 71 as the probability that ail of them hâve low
marginal cost. and 72 as the probability that 9 = O2 (with 71+72 = 1)- We
assume that prior probabilities are common knowledge.
Since our aim is to compare the public agency and the délégation
régimes, we now focus our attention on the two polar cases (in relation with
the gênerai model presented in Section 2.1) where A = d = 1 and A = "d = 0,
in order to identify the impact of imperfect information on the equilibrium
antitrust policies and on the social welfare.
3 Imperfect information : optimal policy under a
public agency régime
In this Section we consider the problem faced by a public agency which
plays the antitrust game and has imperfect information about the industry's
production costs, and with A = tf = 1. We define fi{9i\q) as the agency's
posterior belief that the industry's efficiency state is 9{ when the output q
is observed, with ii{9\\q) + fi{02\q) = 1> Vç. Moreover, let us define aq as
the probability that the 0t- (i = 1,2) industry type produces the output q
c
(with Jo aqdq = 1). If output q is observed, a laissez-faire policy (i.e. no
investigation) is associated to the following expected payoff
Wq{ï3(q)=0)=n{9]\q) f [P{x) - 9x)dx + n{02\q) f [P(x) - 92}dx (7)
Jo Jo
If instead the agency investigates at q, her expected payoff is
Wq{0(q) = 1) = fx{9i\q) f ' [P{x) - 9i)dx + fi(92\q) f \p(x) - 92)dx - K
Jo Jq
(8)
We dénote <ji (i = 1,2) as the output that in case of complète infor
mation in each state makes the agency indiffèrent between investigating and
laissez-faire. Hence from (5), and with A = i? = 1, qi is defined implicitly as
the lowest solution of the following équation :
1 [P(x) - 9i)dx = [ ' [P{x) - 9i]dx - K (9)
o Jo
that is, W{(qi) = Wi{qf) — K. Note that qi < <jf, and q\ < q\. We assume
that qi > q^', which holds if K is small enough, gff < q\ and q\ > q%.136 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(2), 2004
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The latter implies that the efficiency gap is sufficiently large, as one would
reasonably expect for imperfect information about industry costs to matter,
while qfl < q\ means that the costs differentia! between the two states
must not be too large. Figure 1 shows the relative magnitudes of the above
outputs.
We look for an undefeated equilibrium (Mailath et al. (1993)), i.e.
a refinement of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). We define a =
(a*,/3*,n*) as a PBE if the following conditions hold :
1. aq G argmaxq (1 - /3*(?)hMi) - W<?), (t =1,2);
2./3*(q) G argmaxp
3. fi*(.\q) satisfies Bayes rule and it is consistent with industry's stratégies
and prior probabilities.
Next, assume that both a = (a,0,n) and a' = (a', fi', fj,') are PBE,
so that there exist multiple equilibria. With an abuse of notation we write
(as in Mailath et al. (1993)) n(a,9i) for type Vs payoff associated with a.
Then a defeats a' if 3q such that :
• Vi, alq = 0 while for some i alq ^ 0 ;
• Vi such that alq ^ 0, then n((T,6i) ^ n(a',9i) and ir(<r,0i) > 7c(a',di) for
some of them;
• ji'{q\Bi) = 0 exactly for those types for which alq ^ 0 and ir((T,0i) >
Hence a is undefeated if there does not exist any a' that defeats a.29 From
the above analysis, we can state the following Lemma, that will be useful
in Computing the equilibrium :
Lemma 2 Any equilibrium of the antitrust game under the public agency
régime and imperfect information about production costs has the following
features :
i. the highest observed output is q~\, since Vq G Jçi'Ô'it"* 0(q)* = 1 and
Vq G [<7i.<Zi] ~» 0{q)* = 0. The lowest output, denoted as q2, belongs to
the interval [92» 92]» since \/q < q\ /3(q)* = 1;
ii. n*{6\\q~i) = 1, while if //*(#i|<72) ¥" 0 ^en &*{q~2) = 1;
29 The intuition underlying the refinement is the following : consider a proposée) PBE and a message that is
not sent in the equilibrium. Suppose there is an alternative PBE equilibrium in which some non-empty set
of types of the industry choose the alternative equilibrium to the proposed equilibrium. The test requires the
receiver's beliefs at that action in the original equilibrium to be consistent with this set. If the beliefs are not
consistent, the second equilibrium defeats the proposed equilibrium.Gianmaria Martini, Cinzia Rovesti 137
m. Vtfë € [^2,^2]» if we define fii{q2) (i = 1)2/) as the probability which
makes type 9\ (62) indiffèrent between producing 92 <md q\ (q2), then
Proof See Appendix.
With the restrictions in the output feasible set clisplayed in Lemma
2, we can define three types of equilibria in the antitrust game depending
upon industry's strategy.
a. Separating, where a^ = 1 and ar|2 = 1 as in the perfect information case,
so that /**(0i|<7i) = fi*(Ô2\q2) = 1, fj.*{0i\q) = 1 Vç ^ qi, and where the
following pohcy is implemented
with
0
if q < <?,, q ^ q2
(10)
b. Pooling at ^2
i1* (#21<?2 ) =
implemented
c. Semi-separating at
q^* = 1. so that
iÇi]» where q^* =
(^ik) = 1 ^(? 7^ 92
J» wnere
= 1, so that /i*(^i l^l) = 7is
where the following policy is
fi*(6\\qi) = 1, /z*
implemented
M) ~ Wi(<?2) - W2{q$ + W2{q2)
= 1 \fq 7^ q25 and where the following policy is
if
if g < q\ and q ^ q2
(14)
We can now state when the above equilibria are enforced by the op
timal antitrust policy.
Proposition 2 Under the public agency régime and imperfect information
about production costs the antitrust game may hâve separating equilibria, a
unique undefeated pooling equilibrium and semi-separating equilibria.138 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(2), 2004
a. Separating equilibria exist iff A ^ 0, where
A = 7r(g2,02) + ir{qu0i) - 7r(<?2,0i); (15)
while if A < 0 they exist iff
b. A unique undefeated pooling equilibrium at q% E ]q2, q2] exists iff' q?2 solves
K = lx[WM) ~ WifoS)] +72[^2(g2c) " W2{ql)\ (17)
c. Semi-separating equilibria at q2 € ]<72,<72] exist iff B ^ 0, where
B = 7r{q2,e2) + n(qi,0i) - 7r(^,^)
i/e if B <Q they exist iff
Proof See Appendix.
Proposition 2 points out the optimal policy under the three equili
brium types. It is interesting to note that no policy is observed under the
pooling equilibrium, while the separating and semi-separating equilibria in
volve some investigation activities. Moreover, note that if condition (17) is
not fulfilled -iq2 € ]fc,g§[, and if ^M^H^)HM)i
the same interval, then the pooling equilibrium is at q%, while the semi-
separating equilibrium enforces q2 = q2.
Proposition 2 entails an interesting différence between the equilibria
obtained hère, where the agency moves after the industry, and the approach
followed by Besanko and Spulber (1989a) and Souam (1998, 2001), where
the public agency commits to an ex-ante announced strategy. In the lat-
ter framework the more efficient industry type enjoys an informational rent
under imperfect information (in case of complète information it gets zéro
profits). In our approach the unique equilibrium where the more efficient
type enjoys such rent is the pooling one, but the less efficient industry type
obtains a lower profit than in the complète information case (q2 > q2). In
the other two types of equilibria the more efficient type gets the same profit
obtained in the complète information case. This différence between the two
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exists a tradeoff between the social costs due to the investigations needed to
deter the more efficient industry type from mimicking the less efficient type
production and letting it to produce less (but close) than its compétitive
output (and so it gets an informational rent). In our approach there is no
ex-ante deterrence, but only a crédible threat to launch an investigation :
the more efficient industry type cannot reduce its equilibrium output from
the complète information level (i.e. q\ ) because the promise (without com-
mitment) not to launch an investigation for q% < q < q\ is not crédible. The
following Proposition, that states an important resuit about the equilibria's
ranking, partly dérives from thèse arguments.
Proposition 3 Under the public agency régime and imperfect information
about production costs ail equilibria are équivalent in social welfare terms.
Proof : See Appendix.
Since the equilibria are payoff-equivalent in social welfare, the sim-
plest way to write the latter under the public agency régime is 7iWi(<ji) +
72^2(92), which clearly shows that, at the equilibrium, the fine is neutral
in social welfare terms. Proposition 3 highlights an important feature of
the approach where antitrust policy is carried out with discrétion : since no
informational rents are granted to the more efficient industry type (except
than in the pooling equilibrium, but with the négative conséquence of redu-
cing the less efficient type profits with respect to the complète information
case), social welfare is always equal to a linear combination between the two
complète information equilibrium outcomes.
Imperfect information : optimal policy under
délégation
The aim of this Section is to investigate a framework where consumers and
firms play the antitrust game (with A = 1? = 0) and the former hâve imper
fect information about production costs. We define v{6i\q) as the consumers'
posterior belief that the industry's efficiency state is 0; when q is observed,
with v(6i\q) + v{02\q) = 1. Moreover, let A^ be the probability that the 0»
industry type (i = 1,2) produces q (with j^ Ajdç = 1), and let /3D(q) (D
stands for délégation) be the probability that consumers bring the case to
the Court if q is observed. Hence if consumers choose a laissez-faire policy at
q £ g? they get v(6i\q)CS(q) + u(02\q)CS(q) = CS{q), while if they begin
an inquiry and win, their payoff is v(0i\q)CS(çfi) + ^(02\q)CS(q^) + F. If
0o{q) = 0, the industry gets ^(g,^). if instead J3D(q) = 1 and q ^ gf, its
payoffis -{F + K).140 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(2), 2004
We can now state the following :
Lemma 3 Under délégation and imperfect information about production
costs the feasible equilibrium quantities are {qi^q^}, independently of the
magnitude ofti.
Proof See Appendix.
Lemma 3 draws an interesting distinction between the délégation ap-
proach and the public agency régime analyzed in the previous Section.
There, the highest output produced in equilibrium, i.e. qi, is lower than
<7i, which might instead be produced under délégation also in présence of
imperfect information. The explanation is the following : since consumers
get a reward in case of successful investigation (i.e. at any q ^ gf), if this is
greater than the investigation costs that they hâve to pay (and this is always
true if iï = 0 as in the délégation régime considered hère), to intervene is a
dominant strategy. As in Section 2, the différence in the objective function
among consumers and the public agency leads to différent policy outcomes.
To be able to make a full rank between the two régimes, it is necessary
to compute the players' equilibrium stratégies. In doing so we analyze the
players' payoffs at {q^q^î m more détails. If q\ is observed, consumers'
best reply is Pd{qÏ) = 0> and they get CS(qf). If instead q% is observed
and consumers sélect ftoiqZ) = *» tneir payoff is v{0i\q2)[CS(4î) + F] +
v(62\q%)[CS(q%) - K], while with Potâ) = 0 their Pay°ff is CS(q$). Hence
, consumers' best response correspondence at q%, is
1 if lAf) \nc\ - lt U[tfi\q2)
0 X»(^)
Moreover AL, since the 9\ industr>r type's expected profit at q% is (1 -
F) and n{vî>0i) = °> is defined as follows
ir(£$îi+F (21)
[0,1] ;{fii
while \% = 1 (the &2 industry type makes zéro profit). We can now define
the two types of equilibria arising in the antitrust game under the délégation
régime depending upon industry's strategy : 30
30 A separating equilibrium where A1C = A2C = 1 does not exist under délégation, since consumers would
always set
best reply.
always set ftoiq^) - ° and s0 lne industry would react by setting A^,; = 1, so that ff^iq^) = 0 is not aGianmaria Martini, Cinzia Rovesti 141
a. Pooling &t q%, where A*ç = Xfç = 1, so that ^*(0i|<72) = 7i« ""(^îlo^) = 72
and where the following policy is implemented
° {iq = qi (22) 1 otherwise [Z2)
b. Semi-separating at g^ where A^ë > 0, A*ô > 0, A*Ô + A*c = 1, A^ = 1,
so that f*(0i|ç?) = 1, ^*(02|<?î) = 0,
i *
*«m« '; (23) +F+K
(24)
v*{0\ \q) = 1 Vç 7^ {qi, q%}, and where the following policy is implemented
(25)
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium under déléga
tion.
Proposition 4 Under délégation and imperfect information about produc
tion costs there exist two mutually exclusive equilibria : a unique pooling equi
librium and a unique semi-separating equilibrium. In both cases the first best
solution is no longer achieved.
a. A unique pooling equilibrium at q\ exists iff
K>2L [CSfâ) _ cS(qc2) + F] (26)
b. A unique semi-separating equilibrium at q% exists iff condition (26) does
not hold, with
Proof See Appendix.
In case of imperfect information the délégation régime cannot reach
the first best solution, as instead it does in case of complète information.
Indeed consumers, due to imperfect information about industry costs, are
no longer sure that output q% is produced only by the less efficient indus
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than gf. In case of pooling equilibrium consumera cannot avoid this; in the
semi-separating equilibrium consumers, to deter the more efficient industry
type from always producing q%, hâve to investigate at that output even if
there is a chance of unsuccessfûl investigation. The two equilibria shown in
Proposition 4 are mutually exclusive, since the existing one dépends upon
an exogenous parameter, i.e. K. In order to rank the two régimes, we must
compute the social welfare under the délégation régime. In case of a pooling
equilibrium, the expected social welfare is EW = 71^1(^2) + 72^2(92)»
while in a semi-separating equilibrium it is
- 0D(qc2)K) (28)
and by substituting (27) for Ajc and (25) for 0d{q2) we ëet Qw considering
that W,(g§) = W2{qc2) + «(<$À))
Clearly, social welfare in the semi-separating equilibrium is increasing in F.
5 Comparison between régimes
In this Section we investigate the différent performances in social welfare
terms of the two régimes. In Section 2 we hâve already shown that the
délégation régime (weakly) dominâtes the public agency régime in case of
complète information. Section 3 and Section 4 hâve shown that under im-
perfect information the two investigated régimes yield several equilibria. In
the public agency régime the equilibria are ail équivalent in welfare terms,
that is EWP = 7iWi(<?i) +72^2(^2) (where P stands for public agency),
while under délégation the two equilibria are mutually exclusive and pro
duce two différent levels of expected welfare (defined as EWD, where D is
for délégation). The following Proposition ranks the two régimes in case of
imperfect information.
Proposition 5 // the industry has private information about production
costs, the délégation régime dominâtes the public agency régime in social
welfare terms.
Proof See Appendix.
Note that EWP is fine neutral, while dEQKp > 0 in case of semi-
separating equilibrium31 and dEgp = 0 in case of pooling equilibrium.
31 If F - 0 expression (A.24) in Ihe Appendix is still greater than 0.Gianmaria Martini, Cinzia Rovesti 143
Hence Proposition 5 is valid independently of the fine magnitude and on its
(potentially) différent impact under the two régimes.
Propositions 1-5 hâve shown that both régimes will launch an investi
gation in case of "relevant" anti-competitive activities (i.e. those involving
a social loss higher than the policy costs to fight horizontal collusion), while
in présence of "minor" violations only consumers hâve sufficient incentive
to launch an investigation. Délégation to consumers is not needed in case
of relevant anti-competitive activities (the public agency is effective in figh-
ting them), while society has to rely on consumers to deter minor collusive
agreements (since the public agency will instead not intervene). The limi-
ted resources constraint leads the public agency to intervene only against
the more important cases, and consumers may partially (in case of imper-
fect information) relax this constraint. Hence our policy recommendation
is to explicitly déclare in the antitrust législations that there are two main
ways in which antitrust laws are enforced : enforcement actions brought by
the public agency and lawsuits brought by private parties asserting damage
claims.
6 Conclusions
We hâve analyzed whether a social design where the antitrust policy is
carried out in a complementary way by a public agency and by private
agents (namely consumers or their associations) can improve its overall ef-
fectiveness. The two agents hâve différent préférences towards the policy
outcome : consumers only care about their surplus, the public agency looks
at social welfare and takes into account the costs of policy implementation.
To consider a délégation régime is important because the action of a public
agency is curbed by a limited resources constraint, and so she may choose
not to act against "minor" violations of antitrust laws. The optimal policy
has been identified in a model where, as in real world antitrust litigation,
the antitrust agent (being the public agency or the consumers) carries out
its strategy with discrétion, i.e. the choice to investigate or not is taken
after observing a signal sent by the industry. We hâve compared the two
régimes both under complète information and imperfect information about
production costs, and we hâve ranked them in social welfare terms.
The gênerai conclusions that we hâve achieved are the following : First,
délégation may indeed relax the limited resources constraint and so it in-
creases the efFectiveness of antitrust policies because consumers will credibly
start off a higher level of investigation activity than that set by the public
agency. Hence while délégation is not needed to fight against the more im
portant cases (the public agency will credibly act against them because their
damages are greater than the investigation costs), it is instead essential to
deter the industry from being engaged in "minor" violations (where the pu
blic agency will not intervene). This resuit does not dépend upon the rule144 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(2), 2004
adopted to reimburse the investigation costs (délégation dominâtes the pu
blic agency even if consumers hâve to pay ail the investigation costs) and it
is explained by the différence in the two antitrust agents' objective function,
as in the traditional délégation literature (Rogoff (1985)).
Second, under complète information, délégation completely deters the
industry from colluding, while the public agency tolérâtes a little degree
of collusion unless she has not to pay for the investigation. Third, under
imperfect information about production costs, complète deterrence is no
longer achievable also with délégation (but the latter still dominâtes the
public agency régime). Last, under both régimes the more efficient industry
type can enjoy an informational rent only in case of pooling equilibrium (but
the less efficient type gets a profits réduction with respect to the complète
information case).
The délégation régime considered hère seems to be very effective
against horizontal collusion. Indeed the model does not take into account of
some circumstances that may decrease its enforcement power. For instance,
since consumers are too dispersed as a constituency, the model applies well
to their associations, while it is less robust if we consider the behavior of
many individual consumers. On the contrary, consumers may increase the
effectiveness of antitrust policy because they hâve better information about
the industry anti-competitive activities than the public agency. The analysis
of thèse issues is left to future research.
Appendix
Proof of Lemtna 2
(i). In case of complète information (3* (q) = 0 if q ^ q\. Hence, since qi > ç}v/,
7r(Çi>0i) > *"(9)0i) Wq > qi, and so q~\ dominâtes ail q > qi for the 9\ industry
type. Similarly, in case of complète information, 0*(q) = 1 Vg < qi even in the
worst state of nature, 9i. However, in contrast with the perfect information case,
the agency may hâve an incentive to investigate if qi € [92,92] > if m(0i|<?2) # 0-
(%%). Note that oft = 0 Vg > q\ since profits are négative for type 92. Hence
fj,*(9i\qi) = 1. If <?2 is observed and {3(q2) = 0, the agency's payoff is
EW{(5{q-z) = 0) = /x(0, \fc)Wi{qi) + fi(92\q2)W2(q2) (A.l)
while if 0(qi) = 1 she gets
EW{(3{h) = 1) = J*(*il&)[Wifoï) - *] + Mfcl&MWatà) - K] (A.2)
Now EW(0{q2) = 0) < EW(0{q2) = 1) when (since W2(q2) = W2(qï) - K and
fitfi\Ô2)[Wifêi) - Wi(h)} > 0 (A3)
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(iii). The probability which makes the 9\ industry type indiffèrent between pro-
ducing Ç2 or q\ is given by
and if we differentiate it with respect to q2, we hâve
and since çf < q2, — ^ff/1* < 0 and so ^J2l < 0. Hence the Iower is
92 6 [92,92] the higher must be A (92). The same resuit holds for the 02 industry
type (indifférence between 92 and q%).
a
Proof of Proposition 2
a. From Lemma 2 /?(<?2) = 1 unless fi(9i\q2) = 0. Hence to enforce a\2 = 0 it is
necessary that
and to hâve a|2 = 1 we need
(A.6)
0 (A.7)
with ^(92) defined in (A.6) Iower than that sufficient to satisfy condition (A.7).
Hence if we solve the above conditions for /?(?2) and then for F, we hâve
Rearranging it we get
Setting A = 7r(g2,^2) + n(qi,Ôi) - 7r(g2,^i) leads to three cases :
1. A > 0, so that
that is always fulfilled since F » 0, so that separating equilibria always exist.
2. A = 0, —* 0 ^ —7r(92,02)7r(ç"i,0i), that is again always satisfied.
3. A < 0, —» to hâve a separating equilibrium condition (16) must be fulfilled.
b. From Lemma 2 a pooling equilibrium at g2 is not possible. Vg2 € ]<72,<?2], if
/3(ç2) = 1, social welfare is
EW(/3{q2) = 1) = 7i[Wi(gï) - A"] + 72(^2(92) - ^]146 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(2), 2004
while with laissez-faire her payoff is
EW{f3{q2) = 0) = 7iWi(g2) + TaWafaa) (A.9)
Hence to hâve a pooling at q2 it is necessary that (A.9)^(A.8). Now let 92* be
the solution of K = 71 [W\ (gj) - W\ (g2)] 4- 72(^2(92) - W2(g2)] ; then ail output
levels in the interval [q2, g2] can be sustained in a pooling PBE. However, only
the pooling equilibrium at g2 = q2 is undefeated. To see this, consider PBEi,
an equilibrium where, with g > 92, both types produce g, and
if gi < g ^ gi or g = g
otherwise
and if g ^ g then /j,*(9i\q) = 1. Moreover, consider a second equilibrium, PBE2,
such that both types produce q2 and
if gi ^ 9 ^ gî or g = g2
otherwise
and with if g 5^ g2 then (x*{9\\q) = 1. Now suppose that the candidate equili
brium is PBE\ and that g2 is observed. Then, according to the out-of-equili-
brium beliefs, g2 should be produced by type 9\. However, in PBE2 type 92
produces g| and gets an higher profit than in PBEi. Hence type 92 should
produce it and the belief that 92 should be produced only by type <?i is not
consistent, so that PBEi is defeated by PBE2. Vice versa, PBE2 is undefeated,
since each type gets a lower profits by producing any g > g2.
c. Vg2 € ]g2,gi] if ^(92) = 1, social welfare is
EW(/3(q2) = 1) = M*il
while, with the alternative move the agency gets
EW(0(q2) = 0) = niOMWifa) + l*(02\q2)W2(q2) (A.ll)
Hence EW(/3(q2) = 1) = J5W(/3(g2) = 0) when
Since, in a semi-separating equilibrium, q^2 = 1, we hâve
M0il92)= ^.j^ (A13)
««72 71 + 72
Substituting (A.13) in (A.12) and solving for a^2, we get (19). However, to hâve
0 < a\2 < 1, the 9\ industry type must be indiffèrent between producing 91
and g2, while to hâve ajl2 = 1 we need that producing g2 yields non-negative
profits for type 82. Hence
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and
(1 - 0{q2))n(q2i82) - (3(q2)F ^ 0 (A15)
Solving (A. 14) and (A. 15) for fl(q2) and rearranging we get
F[n{q2,e2)
If B = n(q2,92) + 7r(gi,0i) — Tr(q2,0i), then, by repeating the same procédure
shown in part a of this proof, we hâve that if B ^ 0 a semi-separating equili
brium always exists, while if B < 0 condition (18) must be fulfilled.
D
Proof of Proposition 3
The separating equilibrium yields the following expected welfare
EWi = 7iWifêi) + MPihWM) -K} + (1- p(q2))W2(q2)} (A16)
i.e. EWi = TiWifài) + 72^2(92), since W2(q%) - K - W2(q2) = 0 by (9). The
expected social welfare under the semi-separating equilibrium is
EW2 = ti{(1 - ci)Wi(gi) + c4[/?(ç2)(VlM<?i) - K) + (1 - 0(q2))W1(q2)}}
+l2{P(q2)(W2(qc2) -K) + (l- /3(q2))W2(q2)] (A17)
rearranged as (since Wi(gf) — K = Wi(q~i))
EW2 = 71 {Wi(qi) - «;2(1 - 0(q2))[Wi(q!) - Wi(g2)]} + 72^2(92)
+l2(3(q2)[W2(q^) -K- W2(q2)} (A 18)
so that, by substituting for a\2 as defined in (19), we hâve
EW2 = -yiWi(qi) - iiK + 72^2(92) - 72^2(92) + i2f3{q2)K -
+-y2/3{q2)W2(q2) +72^2(92) +72/?(92)H/2(92)-72^(92)^2(92)-l2P{q2)K (A19)
i.e. 71^1(90+72^2(92), since W2(qp - K = W2(q2). Hence EW\ = EW2. Last
social welfare under pooling equilibrium is EW3 = 71^1(92") + 72^2(92)- But
from (17) we know that 7lWx(92) +72^2(92) = l\[Wx{ql)-K\ +72^2(92) -K],
and so, EW3 = EW2 =
u
Proof of Lemma 3
First consider the case -ô = 0. For any 9 < 92, consumers get, by choosing {1} :
1/(01 |9)CS(9Ï) + v{$2\q)CS{q%) + F
while if they sélect {ni} their payoff is: CS(q). Hence {i} dominâtes {ni} when
u(0i\q)CS(qî) + v($2\q)CS(qï) - CS{q)+F > 0
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which is always fulfilled. For any q\ < q < qf consumera posterior belief is
u{9i\q) = 1, and so {i} yields CS(qî) + F, while {ni} gives CS(q). Again the
former dominâtes the latter.
Then consider the opposite case where i9 = 1. For any q < q% the consumers'
payoff associated to {i} is :
qî) + u{e2\q)CS{ql) + F-K
while {ni} gives CS(q). Hence {i} dominâtes {ni} when
- CS(q\+F -K>0
>o
which is always fulfilled if F > K. If instead ql < q < qï then u{d\\q) = 1 and
{i} yields CS(qi) + F — K, while the alternative action gives CS(q). The former
dominâtes the latter if CS(qï) - CS{q) + F - K > 0, which is again satisfied if
F > K. Hence consumers' best reply is /?d(ç) = 1 for any q ^ {ql, qf}. Industry
optimal strategy is to play either q% or ç§ since any other choice will be associated
to a négative payoff. In fact, in each state 0* industry profit for any q ^ {q\, qZ},
\s-(K + F).
□
Proof of Proposition 4
(a) From (20) Phitâ) = 0 if and only if the following inequality holds
uiO^qDiCSiql) - CS{ql) + F) < u(d^)K (A20)
and if Ajc = \\c = 1, we hâve (in case of pooling at q^ then v{0\ \q%) = 7i^72 =
7i) ~Yi[CS{qï) - CS{q%) + F] < 72tf ;solving for K gives (26).
(b) From (21) we know that AjÔ e [0,1] if /3D(^) = w(^+f+k- But from (20)
/^r>(?2) takes this value only if
so that
Solving (A.22) for Ajr. we get (27).
a
Proof of Proposition 5
We first compare EWP and EWD under semi-separating equilibrium in case of
délégation, i.e. the expected welfare shown in (29). If we set EWD — EWP, we
get,
o ^ (Wijqï) - W2(qC2) + F)[7iWi(rf) + -y2W2(qï)}Gianmaria Martini, Cinzia Rovesti 149
since Wi(&) = Wi(gi) - J<\ By simplifying we obtain
so that EWD > EWP. In case of pooling equilibrium under délégation, we set
EWD - EWP = -n(W2(qc2)+ir(q
so that
EWD - EWP = 71 [W2(qr2) + 7r(qï,e1)} - ()
and we know from (26) AT > h±\ (Wi(qï) - W2(q2) + F)
(since CS(qf) = Wi(qf)). Let us assume, by now, that
K = (^) W^î) - ^2(92) + i71)- Hence by substituting the latter in (A.25) we
get EWD - EWP = 71 WifoïHl ~ 72) -71 W2(rë)(l - 72) +7i727r(9§,tfi) + 7iF,
i.e. £WD - EWP = jfiWiiqi) - W2{qï)) + 7i72wfa2,0i) + 7iF > 0. Hence if
K = (îi) (^(«î) " ^2(92) + F), then EiyD > EWP. However K is greater
than this. But from (A.25) d(EWD - EWp)/dK > 0, so that EWD > EWP
also in case of pooling under délégation.150 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(2), 2004
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